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The Agency of ‘‘Triggering Mechanisms’’
as a Factor in the Organization of the
Genocide Against the Armenians of
Kayseri District
Vahakn N. Dadrian
Zoryan Institute
Using the notion of a ‘‘triggering mechanism’’ as a guidepost, this article details the
sequence of events precipitated by the accidental explosion of a bomb a young
Armenian was tinkering with in anticipation of a new round of massacres he hoped
to obviate. The ensuing massive and indiscriminate arrests throughout the length
and breadth of the district, the attendant use of a variety of methods of torture, and
the eventual eradication of the bulk of the district’s Armenian population through
courts-martial, followed by serial executions through hanging, deportation, and
massacre, are depicted and analyzed to demonstrate the exterminatory thrust
of the ensemble of the counter-active governmental measures. The study concludes
that the accidental explosion of the bomb was a welcome opportunity for the
perpetrators, directed by the local leaders of the monolithic political party, the
Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), to proceed with their pre-existing
germinal plan of regional genocide.

Introduction
Generally, in conflictual intergroup relations, powerful perpetrators facing relatively
weak victims tend to rely on a number of standard techniques to either rationalize or
justify their criminal acts. One such technique is provocation.1 The victims’ patience
and endurance is insidiously taxed to the limit, forcing them, if possible, to resist
the provocation effectively. Another technique relates to the sudden commission of
a violent act by a member of the victim group, which signals ominous intent to the
perpetrator group and is seized by it as a pretext for repression. Absent an existing and
simmering conflict between these two antithetical groups, the incident, as a rule,
might lend itself to localization and be handled accordingly. But that very simmering
conflict and the advantage of the huge power differential accruing to the potential
perpetrator group favor the latter’s resort to opportunism. Deliberate acts of
provocation by powerful antagonists always involve calculations, seeking favorable
vantage grounds for projected future actions; hence, they are driven by goal-directed
opportunism. Within the context of perpetrator–victim conflicts, such acts of
provocation tend to acquire a circular thrust that is propelled by the perpetrator.
By way of aggressive and threatening behavior, the potential perpetrator intentionally
produces a level of provocation strong enough to drive the potential victim to respond,
in turn, in a way that is conveniently defined by the former as provocation. Conditions
of acute crisis in interethnic or international relations afford just such opportunities,
whereby the more powerful party to the conflict can proceed to provoke in order to
be provoked subsequently. In brief, the welcome eruption of a crisis combines with
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the substantial vulnerability of the group with which the precipitator of the crisis is
identified to create the triggering mechanism for a magnified response to it.
The initiation of a genocidal campaign in the Kayseri district exemplifies the
lethal role such triggering mechanisms can play, especially under conditions of
acute international conflict. An outlying district of Ankara province in central Turkey,
at the foot of snow-capped Mt. Erciyas and bestriding the course of Kızılırmäk River
immediately below Sivas, Kayseri first emerged in history as Caesarea when Emperor
Tiberius took possession of Cappadocia in 17 CE. In 1419, Sultan Selim I incorporated
Kayseri into the Ottoman Empire. In this context it is tempting to refer to the
assassination by a Jewish youth of Ernst vom Rath, a third secretary in the German
embassy in Paris, on 7 November 1938. This incident unleashed a violent antiJewish campaign that eventually culminated in the World War II Jewish Holocaust.
Central to that genocidal response was the way the Nazis chose to define the
crisis precipitated by the assassination. An editorial in Völkischer Beobachter, the
organ of Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Göbbels, declared on 9 November 1938,
one day after the death of Rath, ‘‘The German people are entitled to identify the
Jews in Germany with this crime.’’ Three days later at a conclave attended by
top Nazi leaders, including Göbbels, Reinhard Heydrich, Interior Minister Wilhelm
Frick, and Economics Minister Walther Funk, Herman Göring, who was chairing
the meeting, made a dramatic announcement. Göring declared that in the course of
lengthy discussions that he had held with Hitler for two days following the antiJewish Kristallnacht riots of 10 November, Hitler had issued an order ‘‘requesting that
the Jewish question be now, once and for all, coordinated or solved one way or
another.’’2 Even though the Final Solution (Endlösung) would require nearly three
more years to evolve and to materialize, the incident of the assassination helped
precipitate matters not only in terms of administrative policies but also in terms
of public agitation and incitement. The Nazi co-optation of the German public
is intimately linked with the broader functions of the triggering mechanism at
issue here.
Within this general purview, this study proposes to examine the role of a similar
incident in the precipitation of cataclysmic events that entailed the violent liquidation
of the entire Armenian population of the Kayseri district during World War I. Driven
by personal revenge, like the Jewish youth mentioned above, a young Armenian
who had witnessed the slaughter of his relatives during the Sultan Abdul Hamit-era
massacres was tinkering with a homemade bomb when it suddenly and prematurely
exploded, simultaneously killing him and creating havoc in his Armenian neighborhood. The severity of the authorities’ response is revealed in the draconian measures
they instituted against the entire Armenian population of the district. Everek,
the town where the bomb went off, was but a sub-unit of that district. The mass arrest,
torture, and execution of hundreds of its Armenian inhabitants, on the one hand,
and the murderous deportation of the rest of district’s Armenian population, on the
other, formed part of these measures. The focus of this study will be on assembling
the details of the retaliatory response by the authorities with a view to demonstrating
the underlying genocidal thrust and aim.

Kayseri’s Governmental Set-Up and the Distribution
of Its Armenian Population
Until its final dissolution in 1923, when the new Turkish Republic was inaugurated,
the Ottoman Empire for centuries was run on a system of provincial administration
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whose level and degree of control by a central authority often depended upon the
nature of that authority. The more autocratic or despotic the central authority, the
stricter and more pervasive its control proved to be, especially in the area of conflict
with the national minorities that constituted a large segment of the multiethnic
empire.
Because the bulk of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire was located
in its Asiatic provinces, the organization and function of this Ottoman provincial
administration bore heavily on the type of treatment the empire’s Armenian
population in general, and Kayseri’s in particular, received during the war. It might,
therefore, be useful to provide here a sketch of that administrative system. The highest
civilian authority was vested in a governor-general (vali) who presided over the
governmental affairs of a province (vilayet). The number of provinces constituting the
empire changed often because the empire kept shrinking, fluctuating between twentyeight and thirty-six. The provinces, in turn, were partitioned into districts (liva or
sancak), which were run by district governors (mutassarrif ). The districts were further
divided into counties (kaza) governed by county executives (kaymakam), who, more
often than not, were religious judges (kadi).3 The counties were further subdivided
into townships (nahiye) comprising groups of small rural villages, each of which
encompassed at least twenty families; these were governed by an administrator
(müdir). The smallest administrative unit was the karye, the village, comprising about
forty or fifty houses and administered by a headman (muhtar).
There functioned as an accessory component of this provincial administrative
system, however, an adjunct group of so-called independent districts. The designation
‘‘independent’’ denoted the idea of a status interposed between a province and a district
and connoted that of an administrative link with either a province or a county.4
On 20 April 1914 (a few months before the outbreak of World War I), Kayseri was
granted the status of an independent district5 by Interior Minister and Committee of
Union and Progress (CUP) ruling party boss Mehmet Talât. Still maintaining some
links with the administration of Ankara province, from which it had been detached
and declared independent, Kayseri district comprised four sub-units (i.e., counties):
its capital, Kayseri, plus the other counties of Bünyan, Develi (also called Everek), and
Incesu. Because of their proximity to each other, Develi (or Everek) and Fenese were
often lumped together as twin cities; Armenians mostly used the Everek-Fenese twin
designation. Combined together, these four counties encompassed some 200 sub-units
(i.e., townships and villages) containing a sizeable Armenian population. Altogether,
Kayseri district had ninety-eight villages, twenty-four of which were attached to
the district’s capital, Kayseri.6
According to official Ottoman statistics released in 1914, Kayseri district’s
total Armenian population was 52,192 persons, of whom 48,659 belonged to the
Gregorian-Apostolic Mother Church; 2,018 were Armenian Protestants; and 1,515
were Armenian Catholics.7 Armenian community life was, by and large, organized
around a network of thirty-two churches and thirty-one affiliated parishes.8

Triple-Layered Authority in Wartime Kayseri
As in every other part of the Ottoman Empire, three distinct kinds of authority
held sway in Kayseri during the war. The principal domain, of course, was civilian
provincial administration, the make-up of which is outlined above. A network
composed of a district governor, four county executives, and several administrators
and headmen was in charge of the mundane affairs of the district. Moreover, because
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Genocide Studies and Prevention 1:2 September 2006

of the ongoing war and the incidence of martial law, the military had gained a
foothold in the power structure of the entire district. It not only took care of such
matters as recruitment, logistics, and transport but handled two additional
matters that would have grave consequences for the Armenians: exorbitant
requisitions, of all kinds and at all levels, and the administration of military justice
through courts-martial.
The overall authority for all these matters except court-martial devolved
upon Colonel Şahabeddin, the military commander of Kayseri district as well as the
Deputy Commander of the 15th Infantry Division, with headquarters in Kayseri
city. Moreover, Şahabeddin supervised the operations of the sub-units of the region’s
gendarmerie regiment that served as the principal escort-guards of the many
Armenian deportee convoys. Accordingly, he regularly reported on the massacres
attending these rounds of deportation to Colonel Halil Recayi, his superior, who
was also the Deputy Commander of Ankara’s 5th Army Corps, of which Kayseri’s
15th Division was a sub-unit. As to the Military Tribunal sitting in Kayseri city and
serially court-martialing the hundreds of Armenians of the district in the wake of
the explosion, typically it functioned as an ad hoc instrument of military justice.
As to the third component of the structure of authority in Kayseri district, it may
be readily argued that it represented the most potent and, therefore, the most
formidable matrix of power in the entire configuration. This component was the CUP’s
omnipotent party organization, whose superordinate functionaries had, as in other
parts of the provinces, the final say in determining the collective fate of Kayseri’s
Armenians. They were part and parcel of a kind of power structure akin to an iceberg:
its submerged part packed all the power needed to conspire, organize, and execute
mass murder. In this sense they ultimately proved themselves to be the controlling
agents of the direction of the cataclysmic events triggered by the explosion of the bomb
described above. Indeed, acting in tandem with Atıf, Ankara province’s provisional
governor-general, Hüseyin Necati, CUP’s regional functionary, discreetly transmitted
to the district’s civilian authorities that politburo’s inexorable directive: the objective
of the deportations was the annihilation of the deportee population.9
As will be described below, Kayseri district’s governor, Aziz Zekâi (Apaydın),
himself a CUP functionary, did implement this directive when ordering the
exterminatory liquidation of the hundreds of Armenians court-martialed, convicted,
and sentenced to long terms of hard labor and prison—in addition to the fifty-five
sentenced to death by hanging.
As might be expected, because of turf wars, personality conflicts, and other
discordant variables, the relationships of the three power tiers were not always
smooth. Despite the developing frictions, however, they did, in the main, know how to
coordinate their actions in a cooperative spirit. In the final analysis, the supremacy
of CUP party leverage and the iron discipline flowing from it were factors in ensuring
the optimal success of the central goal of annihilation.

Precipitation of the Sweeping Crisis
The crisis in question was set off on 24 February 1915 (11 February according to the
Ottoman calendar in use at that time) by the accidental explosion of a homemade bomb
with which a young Armenian was tinkering in his home. Having migrated to the
United States some years earlier, Kevork Hampartzoumian, also known as Defjian,
had recently returned to his native town of Everek, located some twenty-five miles
south of Kayseri city. A solitary and melancholy youth, he had witnessed the ghastly
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murders of his brother and uncle during the 18 November 1895 massacre, though he
himself had miraculously survived the carnage. It was reported that the fear of
imminent new massacres had agitated him enough to try to equip himself with the
means of ‘‘defensive resistance.’’ The subsequent 1909 Adana massacre and the
intensification of the anti-Armenian campaign in the pre–World War I period served to
amplify these fears. It appears that exasperation and a measure of despair drove
Hampartzoumian to a recourse that would soon prove as reckless as it was perilous
for the district’s Armenian population. Severely wounded and in excruciating pain,
he eventually succumbed to his injuries.10
Given the solitary and secretive nature of Hampartzoumian’s venture, the
Armenians of the town were both frightened and surprised by the incident. Aware of
the enormous danger hovering over the Armenian community as a whole, its leaders,
for a very brief period, succeeded in hushing up the incident. Even Adil Bey, the
kaymakam on duty in Everek, went along with this initiative, as he did not consider
the matter of critical importance, given the law-abiding reputation and record of the
town’s Armenian population. The understanding was that a reckless individual with
no organizational ties or support whatsoever had indulged in a dangerous adventure.
Nevertheless, it did not take very long for the district’s central authorities to learn
about the explosion, and they intervened immediately and with a vengeance.
A handyman employed in the local bakery (by a remarkable coincidence, the only
Turk residing in that Armenian neighborhood) contacted higher authorities to inform
them about the explosion. The investigation that ensued resulted in an official report,
a copy of which was relayed to Interior Minister Talât. The die was cast. Everek’s
kaymakam was immediately dismissed and was replaced by Salihzeki, who was not
only his deputy but also the kaymakam of the neighboring smaller town of Incesu.
After taking up his position on 4 March 1915, Salihzeki launched a fierce and sweeping
investigation. Starting with the arrest of the bomb-maker’s family members, relatives,
and even casual acquaintances, and continuing with the arrest of Armenians who had
returned from America for short visits, Salihzeki extended the number of arrests to
include hundreds of other Armenians in neighboring villages and towns, the district’s
capital city, and other major cities of the empire, including its capital, Constantinople.
The Armenians arrested were from all walks of life, including many priests and even
the prominent Armenian parliamentarian Mourad (Hampartzoum Boyajian), a
member of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, the parliament’s lower house—in
total disregard of his parliamentary immunity.
What followed was an intense regime of torture manifested in various forms. As
one survivor averred, Everek’s prison was transformed into ‘‘Dante’s Inferno.’’11
Within a short time the other prisons of the district, such as Incesu, Çomakhlu, and
especially the dungeon of Cafer Bey police station in the district’s capital, Kayseri city,
followed suit.12 Ostensibly, the main purpose of this regime of terror was to extract
as many confessions as possible regarding substantial caches of arms, weapons, and
explosives. The main technique was the gradual intensification of pain. Using the
bastinado method, for example, 300 slashes would be administered to the soles of the
victim’s feet; in cases of sustained resistance and recalcitrance, however, that number
would be doubled. Among the victims were some who lost their minds, while others
committed suicide in prison and still others were crippled beyond repair. The torture of
Deputy Mourad is noteworthy in this respect:
Thrown to the ground, he was administered slashes to his feet, his back, his ribs until
such time as, unconscious, he would end up resembling a cadaver. After having been
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revived through the application of cold water, he vainly would be warned—and the
tortures would be resumed and continued for three days, until his ravaged body was
thrown into the prison’s hospital . . . Mourad was adamant about his rights and his
refusal to yield to violence.13

His superhuman endurance led one of the chieftains of the brigand bands participating
in the massacre of Kayseri’s Armenian population to express his admiration of such
uncommon intrepidity.14
An ancillary and perhaps equally potent driving force in the resort to torture was
the insistence of Salihzeki and his cohorts on obtaining lists and names of presumed
accomplices. In one case, the subject, unable to endure
the torture hour and after hour, for so many days on end, that . . . blurted out,
‘‘Yes, that is the way it was.’’ But this confession did not bring respite. The
tortures continued. The aim was to get [him] to reveal the names of
accomplices . . . The resulting brutality knew no bounds. At one point he became so
exasperated that he exploded. ‘‘Take me to him [Salihzeki]. I have things to confess.’’
When the police ushered him into the latter’s room, he smashed one of the windows
with his fist, and with a morsel of broken glass slashed his own stomach and fell
down unconscious.15

When the same procedure similarly failed to elicit information from another subject,
likewise totally unconnected with the bomb and related acts of conspiracy, Salihzeki,
unable to contain his frustration and rage, ‘‘had the prisoner bound up hands and feet
and had him thrown from the prison roof to the cobblestone yard below.’’16
The sequence of events demonstrated nevertheless that Everek’s governor had a
plan of his own. He was determined to show his superiors—thereby receiving the
requisite accolades and rewards—that he had uncovered a widespread Armenian
conspiracy to sabotage the Ottoman-Turkish war effort in pursuit of certain goals
set forth by the two Armenian political parties, the Hunchaks and the Dashnaks.17
The crisis precipitated by the above-described explosion afforded wide-ranging
opportunities to pursue and successfully carry out this agenda. Foremost among
these opportunities was the atmosphere of pervasive hostility directed against the
Armenians, which had been prevalent in the district since before World War I. As
one historian of Kayseri Armenians points out, with the outbreak of World War I,
the Turkish authorities began doing everything they could to provoke the Armenians
of Kayseri:
In order to agitate the Turkish mobs, they needed to disseminate the story of an
Armenian uprising. The ruinous requisitions, the brutal treatment of Armenian
conscripts, the scandalous methods of house searches, and the severity of attendant
punitive methods had pushed the victim population to paralyzing despair. We, the
Armenians, were bracing ourselves for the terrible fate awaiting us.18

However, the conditions described above were necessary but not sufficient for the
implementation of the plan of wholesale liquidation of the district’s Armenian
population. Other contingencies also need to be considered.

The Devastating Role of Armenian Informers
One of these contingencies involved the successful co-optation of Armenian informers.
Given religious, linguistic, and related cultural differences that often served to
maintain cleavages between Armenian and Turkish communities, the authorities had
very little access to the inner workings of Armenian community life. But the terror
applied in Everek by Salihzeki, the new kaymakam, soon yielded unexpected results.
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Two prominent local Armenians were co-opted to serve as informers for Salihzeki.
In order to enshrine their loyalty and their fidelity to the state, both of them converted
to Islam and adopted Turkish names.19
With the active and eager help of these two convert-informers, the authorities
first obtained a list of all members of Kayseri district’s Hunchak political party.
They then secured the membership list of the Armenian General Benevolent
Union, an organization solely and entirely dedicated to charity work and, in this
sense, a decidedly apolitical body. Based on the information in these lists, a program
of massive arrests was launched, and it was carried out with inexorable severity.
The grip of the arrests extended to such other villages as Incesu, Çomakhlu,
and Tomarza and, inevitably and ultimately, to Kayseri city itself. Hundreds of
Armenians from all walks of life were taken into custody and, without any formalities
or even the pretense of formalities, were cast into the dungeons of the district’s
various prisons.
This act of co-optation was replicated in Kayseri city itself when the head of
that city’s Hunchak party agreed to hand over to the authorities all the party’s records
and registers. Because the Hunchak party had been recognized by the Ottoman
government as a legitimate political party, its leadership, unlike that of the rival
Dashnak party, did not have a sense of urgency relative to the need for secrecy and
concealment. Contrary to expectations, however, the authorities proceeded to arrest
not only the officially registered members of the Hunchak party but also their male
and female relatives, including their children.20 They were assisted in this task by
three additional informers in Kayseri.21
The fate of all those taken into custody was in fact sealed when the two original
informers from Everek signed a statement declaring that there was a definite plan of
Armenian conspiracy. Its aim was, they asserted, an uprising to be spearheaded by
the leaders of the two political parties, Hunchak and Dashnak. This declaration
prompted Salihzeki to push for the adoption by the Turkish government of a radical
policy of persecution and subsequently the framing of a major criminal charge against
the Armenians. The essence of the accusation was that the caches of arms uncovered
during the investigation were intended for an organized rebellion against the
government.22
Despite their persistent and massive investigations, however, the authorities could
not move beyond the discovery of arms caches to establish, by any credible or
substantive evidence, that there was any plan of insurgency on the part of any
Armenian faction or party. Nor could they establish any link at all between the
incident of the bomb and either of the political parties. Perhaps the most bizarre and
wanton aspect of the anti-Armenian campaign at this stage was the arrest and torture
of multitudes of Armenians, including women and children, who had absolutely no
connection with politics, let alone with conspiracy of any sort. But as the discussion
below will indicate, these draconian measures were the signposts of an insidious
covert scheme targeting the entire Armenian population of the district.

Escalated Incrimination: The Government Plants Bombs
in Armenian Residences
The government’s firm resolve to implicate Armenians collectively in the discovery
of concealed caches of arms and explosives was pursued in the twin cities of EverekFenese with such ferocity that some Armenians resorted to an unusual step: they
began to pay exorbitant prices to Turkish neighbors for handguns, only to surrender
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the weapons to the authorities tormenting them.23 The authorities in Kayseri city,
emulating the procedures followed in the twin cities, proved equally ferocious. Like
Salihzeki, they too were trying to impress Interior Minister Talât in Istanbul. But the
value of these acts of overzealousness hinged on tangible results.
Accordingly, A. Midhat, then the mutassarrıf of Kayseri district, embarked
on a plan to secure, one way or another, caches of arms. He approached and persuaded
Bishop Khosrov, the district’s Armenian primate, to have the caches surrendered
in return for ‘‘a benevolent treatment by the government.’’ Enthused by this
proposal, the bishop convened the district’s Armenian Provincial Council, urging
the delegates to comply. But the two Hunchak and Dashnak leaders, who were
invited to the meeting for consultation, advised against such compliance. They
argued that this was a Turkish trap into which Armenians had fallen time and
again, each time paying dearly as a result. Notwithstanding, the council unanimously
voted for compliance to demonstrate its loyalty to the government. In line with
this attitude, Garabed Camjian, the council’s president, went so far as to threaten
to assist the government in challenging all those who might dare to contravene the
collective will of the Armenian community, as duly represented by the council.24
Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, the council’s decision could not be carried
out effectively.
Irrespective of all these Armenian efforts to comply with the demands of Turkish
authorities, however, the district’s central government evidently had its own plan.
Straight compliance by the Armenians might disrupt, if not pre-empt, that plan.
Accordingly, a plot was hatched with a view to gravely incriminating the Armenians as
lethal conspirators. The district governor, along with Kayseri’s police chief, Zeki, and,
equally important, CUP’s regional representative, Cemil Yakub, conspired to have a
number of bombs planted in the residence and vineyards of a local Armenian.25 The
ensuing explosions produced the intended results.26
As the Armenians, bewildered and frightened, sought refuge in their homes, the
house where the bomb had been planted was immediately surrounded by prepositioned police and gendarmes, led by the police chief, Zeki. Nothing incriminating
was found in the house, which was thoroughly searched following the explosion. But
the other bombs, planted in the vineyards, were ‘‘discovered.’’ The Turkish mobs,
already aroused by inflammatory stories about the previous bomb explosion in Everek,
were ready to pounce upon the Armenians. A similar scheme was brought to bear
upon the above-mentioned Garabed Camjian, the chairman of Kayseri’s Armenian
Provincial Council (see note 24). Having surreptitiously entered the basement of his
house, a team of policemen planted a bomb and a handgun there. By pre-arrangement,
a second team then proceeded to ‘‘discover’’ these weapons, following a search that
caused the desired pandemonium.27
What is so remarkable about these two men who were so deceitfully incriminated
is that neither was politically active, not to mention involved in anti-Turkish political
activity. As one contemporary author observed of the first case, ‘‘In reality the poor
man was a totally ignorant person, quite indifferent toward national affairs and,
therefore, unaware even of the existence of revolutionary activity.’’28
As Salihzeki had done in Everek, Zeki prepared an invidious report in which this
totally apolitical man was depicted as an integral part of an Armenian conspiracy.
The stage was now set to implement a plan of massive arrests. Because of their
pre-eminence among the arrestees, it is necessary to review briefly the attitudes
and related actions of the district’s Armenian political leaders.
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The Stance of Armenian Political Leaders
The episodes of anti-Armenian massacres predating World War I left their imprint
on many Kayseri Armenians. The main lesson they drew from these episodes
was the realization that defenselessness creates all the conditions of perilous
vulnerability, which, in turn, emboldens potential perpetrators. During the
1894–1896 Sultan Abdul Hamit–era massacres, and subsequently during the 1909
two-tier Adana massacres, which together claimed some 200,000 Armenians, directly
and indirectly, this condition of total vulnerability proved decisive. However, Kayseri
Armenians had sustained relatively minor losses during the November 1895 massacre
and completely averted a similar massacre in 1909 for which ‘‘thousands of
slaughterers in baggy pants armed to the hilt . . . were poised, ready to strike. The
Armenians were not idle, however.’’29 Armenian volunteer squads, likewise armed,
strategically deployed, and ready to die in self-defense, had succeeded in deterring the
potential massacrers.
Thus, the memory of these historical experiences had prompted a significant
number of Kayseri Armenians, including members of the two political parties, to
procure caches of arms, handguns, and explosives, many of them quite old and
rusty. These were stored in well-concealed locations. Neither the volume of the
weapons nor their uneven quality, as far as their actual usefulness was concerned,
nor the scant number of volunteers poised for self-defense were such as to tip
the balance in case of a real clash with regular units of the Turkish armed and
security forces. This being the case, the evident purpose of all these measures of
arming was the hope of disabusing potential perpetrators of the notion that the
Armenians, as usual, would be easy prey, and thereby to avert a great massacre—as
had been done in the past.30 Of all those Armenian leaders subjected to excruciating
tortures, one from Chomakhlou village ended up admitting this. ‘‘The torturers
detailed for this job had stuffed excrement into his mouth, had shackled his body with
iron hoops, and had lit a fire upon his chest.’’ When he succumbed to these atrocities,
he exclaimed, ‘‘We made these acquisitions [of arms] in order to avoid dying
like despicable dogs.’’31
Despite their turbulent history of rivalry and strife, the Dashnaks and
Hunchaks, facing an imminent national calamity, set aside their differences to form
a united front32 for purposes of defensive resistance. Accordingly, a joint committee
was established for cooperation, while the parameters were left to be determined
by the higher echelons of both parties. It is of utmost significance that the
Hunchak leadership in Istanbul and that of the Dashnaks in Sivas both
advised their cohorts in Kayseri ‘‘not to resort to any uprising and to comply with
the demands of the government.’’33 The sequence of events indicates, however,
that such compliance was not what the authorities wanted. Rather, the execution
of their plan hinged on resistance and confrontation capable of producing violent
clashes and bloodshed. The consummation of such clashes required the arousal,
enlistment, and active participation of Turkish mobs, and the authorities
went out of their way to attain this goal. As one chronicler writes, ‘‘The Turkish
government set out to incite the Turkish people in order to secure its support in
its exterminatory designs. It needed the Armenians to dare to provoke the Turks
by way of an insurrection, or even a plain act of disobedience.’’34 As the war progressed,
in addition to the devastating military requisitions described above, the level
of general depredations and the attendant verbal abuses and insults escalated
ominously.
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The Resort to Summary Proceedings through Court-Martial
The central purpose of the elaborate measures of interrogation and torture detailed
above was to pave the way for criminal prosecutions against those in custody.
The ultimate purpose, however, appears to have been to establish a legal framework
for the justification of the draconian measures soon to be launched against Kayseri’s
entire Armenian population. The authorities therefore needed a plethora of
confessions of a particular type. All those taken into custody for possessing arms, or
for presumed possession of arms, had a simple but basic justification: the CUP regime
had granted to non-Muslims the right to possess such arms. When crushing the 1909
counter-revolution, the guardians of that regime had significantly benefited from
the help of armed Armenian support groups. As one Kemalist deputy recalls in his
memoirs, ‘‘Whether in the market, the streets, or in stores, all kinds of weapons were
freely available for sale . . . Town criers and traveling salesmen peddling their arms
with loud voices were part of this picture.’’35
The Armenians incurred a legal liability, however, when many of them failed to
comply with the government’s wartime order to surrender their arms and weapons,
including knives.36 Disregarding the inveterate anxieties and premonitions about
impending new massacres with which the Armenians were suffused, the authorities
deliberately chose to interpret this reluctance to surrender their arms as a clear
indication of an insurrectionary plan. By this time between 800 and 900 Armenians
from all walks of life were incarcerated in Kayseri’s notorious Depot prison. In this
large, spacious, three-story military barracks that could hold as many as a thousand
prisoners, the incarcerated Armenians were arranged there according to provenance.37
The Military Tribunal, an expanded version of the small court-martial instituted
in Kayseri by the proclamation of general mobilization to handle minor offenses
committed by the military, was formed for the express purpose of prosecuting the
Armenians. It consisted of a president (retired Lieutenant-Colonel Tevfik), Major
Şahab, two other military officers, the deputy public prosecutor, and a record-keeper.
Except for a six-month interval in the second half of 1912, the CUP had been
maintaining throughout the empire a state of siege, and hence martial law, since
19 August/1 September 1910.38 The requisite indictments were prepared, on the one
hand, by Everek’s kaymakam, Salihzeki, and, on the other, by Kayseri city’s police
chief, Zeki. The Armenians were uniformly charged with premeditated conspiracy
against the Turkish army. More specifically, the two Armenian political parties of
Kayseri district were, as collective entities, identified as principal agents of conspiracy;
on account of their presumed consent to this conspiracy, on the other hand, the
regional Armenian notables (eşraf) were charged as accessories.
The proceedings had all the characteristics of a kangaroo-court set-up. No defense
counsel was allowed; the defendants were tried in groups of various sizes, each court
session lasting an average of three to four hours. The standard procedure was as
follows: the prosecutor would pose an accusatory question, and before the defendant
could complete his answer, he would be dressed down with a torrent of new accusatory
questions. The common line of defense of the accused was that their acquisition of
weapons and arms was a legitimate act, since it was allowed by the new constitution.
Moreover, they all maintained, these arms had come in handy when the Armenians
had come to the defense of the imperiled CUP regime in 1909. But this line of defense
was typically twisted by the prosecutor, when he intoned,
Against whom would you have to defend the Constitution? Of course against the other
Turks. And how would you proceed? Of course by massacring the regime’s opponents,
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who happen to be all Turks also. There it is. Your own explicit confession of your
conspiratorial plan.

Allowed to articulate his defense, Kevork Vişabian, the top Dashnak leader among the
accused, made, among others, the following statement:
Do not exaggerate the practical value of a few obsolescent and antiquated handguns
and rusty bombs. They all served a mere precautionary purpose . . . Don’t be carried
away by the exertions of haphazard imagination . . . Is it a sin for a father or brother to
be tempted to think of self-defense when he sees with his own eyes his child or sister
being mutilated and butchered? Can the law ever forbid that elemental right that is
granted by God, is sanctified by religion, and is found enshrined in the annals of
history? Some may counter by saying, ‘‘Don’t you trust the government enough to dare
to organize your own defense?’’ The government can surely protect, provided it can jar
itself loose from confusion and paralysis while it tries to maintain its authority and
attends to the needs of its citizens. But we have already seen that with the outbreak of
revolutionary unrest even cabinet ministers tried to save their heads. As you all know,
one of the most influential one among them had sought refuge in the home of an
Armenian and thereby escaped a tragedy. Esteemed judges, remain true to your calling,
follow the path of justice and stop persecuting the Armenians.39

Neither this oratorical plea nor the discreet religious services held daily in the
Depot barracks prison yielded any tangible results. With predictable regularity the
court found the overwhelming majority of the defendants guilty as charged. The text of
the verdict was published in the district’s official journal in connection with the courtmartial of the first batch of defendants.40 All twelve of them were sentenced to death
by hanging. The other thirty-two defendants were sentenced to various terms of hard
labor and prison. In addition to the official Turkish publication of the record of
conviction and sentencing, the official files of the foreign ministry of allied Imperial
Germany contain the same record in German translation.41
The serial convictions, sentence renditions, and associated hangings of eventually
fifty-five Armenians were staggered during the subsequent weeks, and the hangings
were carried out at a locale called the Coal Pit (Kömürlük).42
The core of the verdict is encapsulated in the following two sentences:
With the intent of unleashing a general uprising against the Ottoman Empire, the
revolutionary Hunchak and Dashnak Committees conspired against the government
at a joint meeting convened at Bucharest. Besides resolving to incite parts of the
Armenian population of the Empire against the government, the said committees also
accumulated hand grenades, dynamite and other destructive weapons.43

There are three ingredients in this judgment: conspiracy, public incitement, and the
accumulation of weapons and explosives (but not any use of them). Clearly the last
item cannot be subject to dispute, with the caveat that it applied only to a segment of
Kayseri’s Armenian community. But the other two elements require closer scrutiny.

The Genocidal Sequela of the Courts-Martial
The recurrent harping on the theme of ‘‘conspiracy’’ as a major weapon aimed at the
Armenians lends itself to projective interpretation. As Shakespeare, through Hamlet,
warned with the dictum ‘‘doth protest too much,’’44 the entire pattern of the
exterminatory persecution of Kayseri Armenians indicates that the perpetrators
were merely projecting when accusing the Armenians of conspiracy: in other words,
they were ascribing to the latter plans entertained by themselves. An array of evidence
underscores the relevance and significance of this social-psychological mechanism.
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Here are some examples. By governmental fiat, the matter of the wartime deportation
of the Armenians had been declared a peremptory response to anticipated Armenian
insurrections; as such, they were declared military business and a military
responsibility. The Temporary Law of Deportation of 13/26 May 1915 explicitly
stipulates this in articles 1 and, particularly, 2. Colonel Şahabeddin, referred to above,
emphatically reiterated this point in cipher telegrams he sent to Colonel Recayi, his
superior in Ankara,45 who had expressed his displeasure at the civilian authorities’
intervention in the matter.
In early August 1915, however, at Talât Pasha’s behest, military commanders
were advised by a circular from the High Command that in areas outside the theaters
of war, the responsibility for handling the deportations would henceforth devolve upon
civilian authorities. The emerging cleavage between civilian and military authorities
on this issue found its expression in several reports dispatched by Colonel Şahabeddin
to his superior in Ankara, in which he complained about the instigations alleging
rebellious activities by the Armenians. With special reference to such Kayseri-district
villages as Erkilet and Mancusun, for example, he accused Zekâi, the district’s
governor, of falsely accusing the Armenians of armed assaults. This prompted Colonel
Recayi, Şahabeddin’s superior, to instruct him to henceforth discount civilian sources
and rely only on the military ones. An integral part of these reports, prepared by the
regional military authorities, were references to numerous acts of pillage, plunder,
and robbery committed by the security forces harassing and tormenting the targeted
Armenians.46 However, in the overall picture of a relatively well-coordinated genocide
undertaking, this discordant aspect of the conduct of the region’s military commanders
was but an accidental aberration, due mainly to the CUP’s conspiratorial secrecy.
To emphasize the supremacy of his authority over the matter of Armenian
deportations and to underscore the related urgency of draconian measures, interior
minister and CUP party boss Talât Pasha paid a visit to Kayseri. At a specially
convened meeting to which prominent Turkish-Muslim leaders were invited, he
denounced the Armenians as a disloyal (sadakatsız) internal foe in league with the
Ottoman Empire’s external enemies. Therefore, he said, it had become imperative that
they be expelled and deported as disloyal elements.47
For his part, Enver, minister of war and de facto commander-in-chief of the
Ottoman Armed Forces, rebuked the Kayseri courts-martial for not being harsh
enough, and for not sentencing all the hundreds of defendants uniformly to death by
hanging. He particularly took issue with the text of the verdict, in which the victims
were accused merely of having formed a revolutionary movement and of incitement
against the empire’s Muslims. He wanted the Military Tribunal to focus on a principal
charge, that is, the aim of creating ‘‘an autonomous and independent [sic] Armenia.’’
That charge, the focus of the Istanbul courts-martial that had simultaneously tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death twenty Hunchakist leaders,48 was connected with
the annex of article 54 of the Ottoman Penal Code stipulating the sentence of death.49
Enver ended his directive with the admonition that it had to be treated as a ‘‘secret
matter’’ (sureti mahremane). Irrespective of individual merits and differences,
Armenians being court-martialed within this purview were to be uniformly treated
(tevhidi tatbikat) as candidates for the death penalty.
Nevertheless, the supreme authority, the CUP’s so-called politburo, was growing
impatient with the piecemeal and protracted handling of the 800 to 900 Armenians
remanded to the courts-martial for criminal prosecution and punishment. The
district’s governor, Aziz Zekâi (Apaydın), a CUP leader originally from Bosnia,
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where his Christian ancestors, like so many others, had converted to Islam, was
particularly restive in this respect. In tandem with local CUP functionaries, he began
to agitate against the tribunal’s judges, attacking them as too formalistic and hence
not as efficient as they were expected to be. The CUP’s Kayseri branch had already
prepared a list of those Armenians they wanted liquidated wholesale and swiftly.50 But
most of them were languishing in prison, either awaiting their turn for court-martial
or serving out their sentences. Zekâi decided to pay a visit to the main Depot prison.
Here is the narrative of one of the prisoners there, an eyewitness to that visit:
I still vividly remember his sudden appearance at our prison. Gruff-looking, he
inspected the prisoners in the first and second floors without uttering a single word. As
he was about to exit from the main door of the prison, he turned to his two companions
and with a hateful voice intoned, ‘‘Why keep them here? Make a clean sweep of them
forthwith.’’ We overheard this deadly exhortation with dizzying gloom.51

In defiance of the verdict dispositions of the Military Tribunal, the underlings
of the district governor proceeded to systematically remove almost all of the 1,095
Armenian inmates from their prison cells. Over a period of several weeks, they were
tied together with heavy-duty ropes and were marched out in seventeen separate
batches to the various valleys of neighboring Sivas province, where they were
massacred. Several detachments of brigands (i.e., convicts released from various
prisons) were deployed in the area of Kanlıdere (‘‘Bloody Valley’’), a triangular region
formed by the towns of Gemerek, Şarkışla, and Aziziye, for such massacre duty.52
The final stage in the process of liquidating Kayseri district’s Armenian population
was the official proclamation (actually a decree) of 26 July/8 August 1915, ordering the
wholesale deportation of the rest of the victim population. Like those convicted by the
courts-martial, the overwhelming majority of that population perished in the process,
either through massacres53 or by attrition, dying of exhaustion, disease, or starvation.
In the end, the agency of the triggering mechanism proved pivotal, as the
Armenian presence in Kayseri was terminated through a cataclysm that replicated
itself in many other provinces of the moribund Ottoman Empire in the relatively
brief period between spring 1915 and summer 1916. But there occurred an event
in Kayseri, in the aftermath of this cataclysm, that was both distinct and peculiar:
a criminal investigation was initiated to identify and prosecute the ensemble of
the Turkish leaders responsible for that cataclysm. The man in charge of that
pre-trial investigation was the wartime mayor of Kayseri, who, remarkably, at the
time of the investigation, had remained in his job as mayor. This study will conclude
with an examination of the significance of this post-war Turkish attempt at
retributive justice.

The Aftermath: The Aborted Post-war Initiative of Retributive Justice
Unwilling to concede and confess to a crime, perpetrators tend to resort to denial or,
in other cases, to explanations that aim to justify their actions. This aim becomes most
urgent with respect to the capital crime of genocide. The institution of courts-martial
in Kayseri and the proceedings associated with them were initiatives intended to
justify the crime of genocide in progress. Even the Turkophile Arthur Zimmermann,
at the time foreign minister of Germany, in a ‘‘very confidential’’ communication to
Count Paul Wolff-Metternich, Germany’s ambassador to Ottoman Turkey, conceded
that Turkey’s anti-Armenian campaign, placed under the rubric of ‘‘national security,’’
could conceivably be defended ‘‘with an appearance of legality’’ (‘‘mit einem Schein des
Rechtes verteidigt werden konnte’’).54 Thus, in plain language, what these authorities
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needed were plausible pretexts. The errors that sometimes crept into the process,
however, inevitably revealed the totally false, and even farcical, character of these
pretexts. The following example illustrates this point. In its verdict of 2 June 1915,
pronouncing a sentence of ‘‘death by hanging’’ for the first batch of the fifty-five
doomed Armenians, the court-martial erroneously, or falsely, declared that ‘‘Hunchak
and Dashnak party leaders had decided in a Congress in Bucharest to initiate action
against the Turkish government.’’ The fact is, however, that that congress was
convened only by a faction of Hunchak party and that the Dashnaks had absolutely
nothing to do with it and hence could not have participated. This falsehood found
expression in the two propaganda pamphlets issued by the central government during
the war.55 In commenting on one of them as a ‘‘cleverly framed’’ pamphlet, the veteran
Austrian ambassador to Turkey, Johann Margrave von Pallavicini, wrote the following
to his foreign minister in Vienna:
To massacre the men and to deport women and children who, due to lack of transport
and provisions, arrive in frightfully diminishing numbers, is a procedure which not only
cannot be justified, but forever will remain a blot [Schandfleck] on the reputation of the
Turkish government.56

That reputation would be a test case for a succession of post-war Turkish
governments desperately trying to cope with the consequences of the wartime
Armenian cataclysm. Indeed, the full scale of that cataclysm came into full relief
when courts-martial were established in the Ottoman capital to deal with the problem
legally. (These proceedings have been detailed and analyzed in a previous article).57
Departing from this modus operandi of confining the criminal proceedings to the
Ottoman capital, post-war authorities in Kayseri decided to prosecute in loco the
respective Kayseri officials and their accomplices. The man responsible for this
initiative was Ahmet Rifat (Çalıka), the long-sitting mayor of Kayseri city.
Commenting on the attributes and virtues of this Turkish official, a Kemalist
deputy wrote, ‘‘Rifat was an enlightened jurist; he was free from any kind of
fanaticism . . . scant on words and correct in his behavior . . . he obeyed the dictates of
his conscience allowing to determine that behavior.’’58 After the advent of the Kemalist
regime, Rifat was elected as a deputy to the new Grand National Assembly and was
subsequently appointed to the post of minister of justice. For all these reasons, his plan
to prosecute the wartime Kayseri perpetrators and the specifics of the related charges
acquire inordinate significance.
In a book edited by his son and containing Rifat’s memoirs, these specifics are
embedded in the texts of a series of formal indictments. These legal charges were made
public in 1992 and are exceptionally significant in that the issue involved touched
the taboo subject of the Armenian Genocide, which had been aggressively denied
throughout the entire history of modern Turkey. In separate tables included in this
book one can identify all the names of the principal perpetrators in the Kayseri district,
along with the specific charges and the requisite measures of punishment. Rifat
indicates in a note attached to the indictments that the indictments were framed on
the basis of ‘‘documents secured in the course of pre-trial investigations.’’59 Foremost
among the indictees were the two principal perpetrators of the cataclysm that fully
merits the designation ‘‘Armenian Genocide.’’ One of them, Salihzeki, the inexorable
kaymakam of Develi (Everek), was charged with torture, bribery, and rape. The other,
Zekâi, the governor of the Kayseri district, was charged with multiple murders. Three
dozen other officials, particularly gendarmes of various ranks, ranking police officers,
lower-level governors, CUP party functionaries, and local party leaders, identified by
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name and status, were among the indictees. The punishments proposed variably
referred to articles 45, 103, and 170 of the Ottoman Penal Code, providing for
sentences ranging from death to terms of hard labor.
A noteworthy aspect of this series of indictments is the prominence of charges of
pillage, plunder, robbery, and thievery, not to speak of serial rape, which were depicted
as crimes ancillary to that of organized mass murder. It appears that with very few
exceptions, practically all the perpetrators, from the highest to the lowest rank—
especially Salihzeki, the arch-perpetrator—actively engaged in this type of license,
raising the fundamental issue of the role of personal incentives involving greed and
cupidity in genocide. As the veteran wartime US consul at Aleppo, Jesse Jackson,
reported to Washington, DC, an integral part of the organized, wholesale extermination of the Armenian population involved ‘‘a gigantic plundering scheme.’’60
But, as far as the ultimate decision makers in the Ottoman capital were concerned,
superseding these incentives in the first place was the more basic, pervasive, and
compelling drive to radically exterminate the people subsequently to be disposed of. As
Jackson was trying to inform Washington, the supreme, superordinate goal of the CUP
was to deliver the ‘‘final blow to extinguish the [Armenian] race.’’61 The explanation
and the allied justification for this lethal attitude was provided by Salihzeki. When
a delegation of Armenian notables was pleading with him to relent in his persecution,
he responded thus:
You Armenians are progressive people, you are industrious and productive. I wish we
Turks could be like you. The trouble is that these conditions are inimical with our
national interests. How can we acquiesce to the fact that the Turk, the master of this
land, has become your servant. The Armenians live in comfortable homes, but
the Turks are confined to huts and sheds. The Armenians dress well, eat well, while the
Turks have to contend with rags and dry bread. Now that the opportunity has
presented itself, we are determined to annihilate you. Your sympathies for the Allied
Powers make this even more expedient. Your annihilation will not be carried out
quickly and swiftly but will be accompanied by torment and torture.62

The ascendancy of Kemalism in defeated and prostrate post–World War I Turkey,
and its ultimate triumph, nipped in the bud any and all prosecutorial efforts. As a
result, for example, Zekâi, Kayseri’s district governor, first escaped to his native Bosnia
to avoid prosecution, then proceeded to join the Kemalist movement. He subsequently
rose to such high positions in the new Republic of Turkey as deputy in the new Grand
National Assembly; twice ambassador at London, then at Moscow; and minister of
public works and minister of defense.63 As to the other principal perpetrator, Salihzeki,
he fled to Baku to join a new group of Turkish communists, with the aim of importing
that ideology and movement into Kemalist Turkey.

Conclusion
This study has attempted to show that triggering mechanisms, often intimately
connected with the outbreak of large-scale conflagrations and cataclysms, may under
certain circumstances be considered necessary conditions for the explosion and
consummation of the underlying conflicts. But they are not at the same time sufficient
conditions. The elements of the conflict, the power relations between a potential
perpetrator and a potential victim, and the level of opportunity available for the
consummation of conflict are variables to factor in when assessing the matter of
sufficiency. What happened in Kayseri during World War I was the sanguinary
culmination64 of a protracted historical conflict between an omnipotent state
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organization and a highly vulnerable minority group. Moreover, the advantages of the
resulting power differential were monopolized by a monolithic political party that
reigned supreme in directing the internal and external policies of the state.65 This
exercise of supreme power by a political party could be achieved because the most
powerful CUP leaders were at the same time ministers, Army commanders, and other
state officials, such as provincial governors. Not only were the two pre-eminent
organizers of the Armenian Genocide top CUP leaders, for example, but one of them,
Talât Pasha, was interior minister and subsequently grand vizier (a sort of prime
minister), while the other, Enver, was both deputy commander-in chief of the Ottoman
Armed Forces and minister of defense. Both men played a decisive role in the
organizational and legal arrangements that ensured the wholesale liquidation of the
Armenians.
In brief, the genocide of the Armenians as enacted in Kayseri during the war, just
as in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, was predicated upon such major determinants
as the history of lingering Turko-Armenian conflict; a critical disparity of power
relations between perpetrator and victim, yielding the vulnerability ingredient; and the
optimal opportunity afforded by the war. Above all, however, it was predicated, just as
in Nazi Germany, upon a fusion of government and party machineries, with the latter
holding implacable sway and, accordingly, giving content and direction to that fusion.
The more or less unhindered configuration of these factors was such as to ensure a very
high degree of success in the implementation of the genocide. Ultimately, however, the
genocidal fate of the Kayseri Armenians emerges here as a function of critically
disparate power relations, as noted above. The dominant Turks took full advantage of
their overwhelming power position vis-à-vis a near totally defenseless minority. The
conditions of the war were such as to maximize the statutory vulnerabilities of that
minority, trapped in the vortex of a consuming global war. Problems of prejudice,
discrimination, and exclusion, compounded by the formal declaration of holy war,
jihad, combined to aggravate the plight of the victim population. Determined to avoid
any and all provocations, the bulk of that victim population tried desperately to be as
accommodating as possible toward the authorities and their incremental demands. Yet
all this proved futile. It may be fitting to conclude with a statement in which Henry
Morgenthau, wartime US ambassador to Turkey, succinctly highlights the twin
problems of vulnerability and provocation as twin pivotal factors.
In the organization of the Armenian Genocide as a whole:
Though the air all during the autumn and winter of 1914–15 was filled with
premonitions of trouble, the Armenians behaved with remarkable self-restraint. For
years it has been Turkish policy to provoke the Christian population into committing
overt acts and then seizing upon such misbehavior as an excuse for massacres. The
Armenian clergy and political leaders saw many evidences that the Turks were now up
to their old tactics, and they therefore went among the people, cautioning them to keep
quiet, to bear all insults and even outrages patiently, so as to not give the Moslems the
opening which they were seeking . . . ‘‘even if they burn a few of our villages . . .’’ these
leaders would say, ‘‘do not retaliate, for it is better that a few be destroyed than that the
whole nation be massacred.’’66
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